Discretionary policy in a monetary union with sovereign debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policymakers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fiscal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady-state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However, if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with significant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy

Scale invariant properties of public debt growth

Public debt is one of the important economic variables that quantitatively describes a nation's economy. Because bankruptcy is a risk faced even by institutions as large as governments (e.g. Iceland), national debt should be strictly controlled with respect to national wealth. Also, the problem of eliminating extreme poverty in the world is closely connected to the study of extremely poor debtor nations. We analyze the time evolution of national public debt and find "convergence": initially less-indebted countries increase their debt more quickly than initially more-indebted countries. We also analyze the public debt-to-GDP ratio R, a proxy for default risk, and approximate the probability density function P(R) with a Gamma distribution, which can be used to establish thresholds for sustainable debt. We also observe "convergence" in R: countries with initially small R increase their R more quickly than countries with initially large R. The scaling relationships for debt and R have practical applications, e.g. the Maastricht Treaty requires members of the European Monetary Union to maintain R < 0.6.Comment: 9 pages, 8 figure

Discretionary policy in a monetary union with sovereign debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policy- makers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to govern- ment debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fiscal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology pre- cludes a random walk in steady state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with significant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.

Redefining the Economical Power of Nations

This paper is (over the formulas) self explaining . The measurement of economies no longer by GDP alone, but by an Index that includes other important factors as well, a So-cial factors relativized GDP. This index cuts out the part of the GDP that is long term fro-zen up by social transfers (using the highly aggregated GINI coefficient). Social factors relativized GDP: GDP – GDP x GINI = K_Index Written differently: (1 – GINI) x GDP = K_Index Inflation indexed Version: (1 – GINI – Inflation) x GDP = K_Index_Infl. Productivity Index: K_Index / Labor Force = K_PROD Inflation indexed Productivity Index: K_Index_Infl. / Labor Force = K_PROD_Infl. Debt-to-K_Index: National debt / K_Index = K_Debt Debt-to-K_Index_Infl: National debt / K_Index_Infl. = K_Debt_Infl

A simple and flexible alternative to the Stability and Growth Pact deficit ceilings. Is it at hand?

We use a simple theoretical model of a monetary union where myopic discretionary fiscal policies generate excessive debt accumulation in steady state and inefficiently delayed debt adjustment following a shock. We advocate the adoption of a flexible debt targeting approach. By setting a long-term debt target and by raising the political cost associated to deviations from the optimal pace of debt reversal following a shock¸ institutional design induces the fiscal policymaker to implement unbiased discretionary responses to shocks. Since the power to discipline fiscal policymakers rests in the hands of national voters, this outcome can be achieved by increasing the transparency of the decision-making process, where national voters understand the long-term consequences of fiscal policies. In practice, we call for clearer and more focused supervision tasks for the European Commission and for a more active role of national Parliaments whenever a disagreement arises between the Commission and a national government.

The national debt: a secular perspective

An examination of the various factors that have determined the level and growth of the federal debt over the past 40 years, with some perspective on future levels of federal debt.Debts, Public ; Budget deficits